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Abstract
Recently economists have begun to study various aspects of public sector institutions (with their 
behavioral neighborhoods) and their effects on the long run economic development. Degrees of 
corruption, rule of law and protection of property rights have all apparently significant economic 
impact. These results are all based on the construction of indicators for these difficult-to-observe 
explanatory variable complexes. In most cases the indicators applied have been developed for 
most countries and have on the one hand ‘nice’ statistical properties when embedded in regres-
sion equations, but on the other hand are conceptually fuzzy with unclear relationships to basic 
observations. In this paper we go through many of the same relationships, but based on inter-
national efforts to collect questionnaire information about citizens’ experience with crime and 
police corruption. This information is more conceptually distinct and likely to be more closely re-
lated to relevant experience, but proves on the other hand less amenable to econometric analysis. 
Despite the latter weakness we have found it worthwhile to pursue it in order to complement the 
indicator- based approaches. 
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Introduction 
Recently economists have begun to investigate a number of institu-
tional conditions for growth. One question raised is how the degree of 
security of persons and property may impact economic development 
and human welfare. Based on different indexes, the importance of the 
degree of security is confirmed for growth and for investment in hu-
man and physical capital (Barro, 1991; Lloyd-Ellis and Marceau, 
2003; Hall and Jones, 1999). Other studies had showed that corruption 
has a negative impact on growth (Mauro, 1995; Mo, 2001). 
 
The purpose of this paper is to explore whether some specific sets of 
criminal actions that have impact on the security of property and per-
sons and the behaviorally related police corruption may have signifi-
cant impact on the long run economic development. Many of the 
econometric problems that arise when studying these effects are re-
lated to the rather obvious fact that these questions may be equally 
important in reverse: How are the incidence of crime and corruption 
related to the characteristics of economic development itself – its de-
gree of economic inequality, its incidence of poverty; its speed? 
(Bourguignon, 2001; 1999).  
 
Whatever the causal direction in the crime-development relationship 
that is sought, it may appear reasonable to start out with official crime 
statistics as the empirical basis. This has proved to be extraordinary 
misleading, however, when crime is related to development. The sim-
ple reason is that as police organizations become more efficient and 
trusted, the fraction of crimes recorded by the police tends to increase 
so strongly that it overshadows the movement in actual crime rates. 
Even the sign of the regression coefficients tend to be wrong (Soares, 
2004). This has led to serious misunderstandings of the likely relation-
ships between economic development and crime.  
 
In another strand of research where crime-corruption nexuses have 
been related to economic growth rates or levels of income and pov-
erty, the empirical starting point for assessing the quantitative signifi-
cance of the nexus has been a set of indicators for corruption, ‘rule of 
law’ or ‘degree of property rights protection’. Large research efforts 
have been made in the construction of such indicators. They often 
produce interesting and statistically significant results either as ex-
planatory or explained variables in connection with economic growth 
rates or income levels. Unlike the case of official crime statistics it is 
not obvious that the indicator statistics will lead to wrong conclusions. 
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The problem with them is rather different. It is as a rule unclear 
whether the indicators really reflect the phenomena they claim to 
stand for. Even in the best cases they remain conceptually fuzzy and it 
then remains somewhat unclear what they may explain. The concep-
tual content of any regression equation they become embedded in thus 
has to become fuzzy itself. When heavily based on the perceptions of 
a subset of actors, the indicator may in the worst cases stray far away 
from any likely reality (Razafindrakoto, 2006). Nevertheless, while in 
general rather fuzzy, their use may be very valuable in research. The 
alternative may become complete research silence about the involved 
processes and relationships. 
 
Here we explore the alternative of looking at these relationships and 
processes by using so-called crime victimization survey data (Interna-
tional Crime Victimization Surveys, ICVS) that have been collected 
for a number of countries, mostly by the efforts of a UN-sponsored 
group of researchers (Van Dijk, 2008). In addition to regular crime 
experiences the respondents in some of these surveys are also asked 
about their experience with corruption in general and police corrup-
tion in particular. Unlike the indicator based analyses the meaning of 
the various observational values ascribed to crime and corruption 
events are not conceptually fuzzy. On the contrary, one of the strong-
est assets in the ICVS approach is the relatively clear and comparable 
definitions of the original crime and corruption events used in the dif-
ferent country surveys that constitute our empirical basis. Alas, our 
approach has its own weaknesses (which we discussed in section 2) 
that may lead scientific purists into silence.  
 
Despite these weaknesses are these data neither as misleading in con-
junction with economic development as the official crime statistics 
(Scorzafave and Soares, 2009; Glaeser, 1999) nor so fuzzy and diffi-
cult to interpret as the perception indicator approaches. But, they lead 
into a number of statistical difficulties. These may be one of the rea-
sons that ICVS statistics have rarely been used, specifically to assess 
the macro-economic consequences of crime or police. In the literature 
we have so far only found one paper that is closely related to ours 
(Chatterjee and Ray, 2009)1 While we are unable to solve all the prob-
lems related to the ICVS statistical weaknesses we find it worthwhile 
                                                 
1  They use the same ICVS data, look at the interactions between crime victimization and 
bribery victimization, and how this may impact growth at the macro level. They find an 
association between crime and bribery, but fail to ascertain robustly their effects of 
growth. Our study departs from the Chatterjee and Ray’s one in several aspects, however. 
Our main concern is on the long run development and we seek to highlight the mecha-
nisms behind the impact of crime, inter alia by paying attention to human capital accumu-
lation. In addition, we suspect there must be problems with their descriptive statistics. The 
crime rates they calculate (see their table A1) are extraordinarily high. For example, they 
estimate Finland to have had a crime rate of 100% in 1991! 
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to persevere since the alternatives of either speculate, neglect or study 
the issues through indicators are not satisfactory either.  
 
It is obvious that the level of development also influence crime and 
police behavior, and plausibly more strongly so than the effects in our 
direction. Nevertheless criminal behavior appears to have some com-
ponents that may not be explained by levels of development, eco-
nomic inequality and other heavy-and-easy-to understand economic 
forces, components that must be considered exogenous by our present 
state of knowledge. Microeconomic research by Glaeser (1999) com-
paring crime levels in different US cities, finding them unexplained by 
income and inequality, suggests that forms of social interactions may 
explain some. The wide variation in crime levels across continents 
(Andvig and Shrivastava, 2009) suggests that there may also be im-
portant cultural components in crime behavior that in some respects 
are exogenous to economic development. Hence we consider it to be 
of interest to study the impact of crime and police corruption on de-
velopment and try to isolate these effects from the ones that go in the 
other direction. Since these are likely to be quite strong, we have to 
put considerable efforts to control for those. In order to be able to do 
we have had to apply instrumental variables and bootstrapping tech-
niques.  
 
Regarding substance the present paper deals specifically with four 
complementary issues: (i) How does the crime affect the level of de-
velopment? (ii) How does the police corruption affect the level of de-
velopment? (iii) Are there indirect mechanisms through which the in-
cidence of crime is transmitted to the economic performance where 
we also have sufficient empirical information? Here, we focus on fac-
tors such as education and health. (iv) We explore whether violent 
crime and property crime may have different impact on development. 
 
The paper is organized as follows. We first outline a set of mecha-
nisms where crime (and /or police corruption) may in a plausible ways 
affect economic development and derive empirical hypotheses about 
effects of crime and police corruption on the level of development 
(section 1). We carry out econometric analyses of these effects in sec-
tion 2 where we seek to take care of the econometric issues that arise 
from reverse causality. Section 3 explores whether violent crime and 
property crime have different effects. Section 4 provides additional 
tests. 
 
1. Crime, police corruption, and  
development: the theoretical issues 
1.1. Crime and economic development 
Crime rates vary considerably across countries and generate economic 
and social costs to the society, but are these costs heavy enough to 
have traceable effects on the countries long run development?2 To an-
swer that question we need to consider a number of factors that earlier 
research has shown to be significant determinants. Hence, the focus of 
this paper is the marginal impact of crime on long run development. 
 
Let us then first look at some of the mechanisms that may explain it. 
Some are mainly related to the supply and use of labor. If a larger 
share of the population in country A than in country B is routinely en-
gaged in criminal activities, the share of the population engaged in 
production will be smaller. In particular, youths are normally overrep-
resented in criminal activities. Crime may easily become an alterna-
tive to education. Hence, crime is likely to have a negative effect on 
education and the education level in A would tend to be lower than in 
B,3 Here we have a number of spillover effects: good brains go to 
gangs instead of school, bullying at school destroy learning, quality 
schools may not develop in high violence areas. Barrera and Ibanez 
(2004) identify a certain number of channels through which violence 
affects education.4 
 
Other represent pure waste of labor power: a larger share of the labor 
power in A is likely to be spent on preventing crime through guards, 
security companies, the monitoring of employees and so on. Working 
hours may be confined to day light time in the high crime areas. Vio-
lent crime in particular may have this effect. All these effects are 
working on the supply of (productive) labor power (Nunn, 2007; 
                                                 
2  Klaus (1994) estimated that USA lost around 0.3% of their GDP in 1992 due to crime. 
Gaviria (2002) finds substantial negative effects of corruption and crime on sales growth 
where crime has a more pronounced effect on economic outcomes than corruption. Crime 
constitutes also an important obstacle to business in Africa countries: according the in-
vestment climate survey 2005, 37% of surveyed firms in Nigeria identify crime as a major 
or severe constraint on their business. This proportion increases to 50% in Zambia and 
70% in Kenya.  
3  Here again we are likely to have a reverse effect: If a larger share in B is students, they are 
less likely to engage in criminal activities.  
4  Londoño (1998) estimated that in Colombia, the loss incurred in education in the 90s is 
equivalent to 4% of GDP. Idiosyncratic evidence based on a survey of ex child soldiers in 
Uganda (Blattman and Annan, 2009), showed (surprisingly) that while the extreme hor-
rors they had been through have had only minor effects on their post-war income, the de-
lays in their schooling have had strong negative effects.  
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Mehlum et al, 2005; Lloyd-Ellis and Marceau, 2003, Hall and Jones, 
1999). 
 
Other work mainly through the supply and use of capital: If crime 
rates are higher a larger share of capital in A has to be spent on pre-
venting crime: The fences will be higher with reinforced neighbor-
hood effects: It will be risky to have the lowest. Expenses to burglary 
alarms, monitoring devices, lighting and so on tend to be higher re-
ducing the share of capital that will be allocated to production.5 In the 
case when production may be located either in A or B, investors will 
tend to allocate capital in B reducing the amount of capital allocated in 
A.6  
 
Important negative effects of crime on production work also through 
increased transaction costs: For example, when fraud are prevalent 
many profitable business deals will never be made, increased efforts 
and time will be spent on monitoring quality of goods and services to 
be bought. If serious violent crime is prevalent physical transport costs 
will also increase as cars become robbed or extra drivers will be hired 
to prevent it. At sea pirating will also increase the transport costs. 
 
Despite all the capital and transaction costs of crime we will in the fol-
lowing estimations concentrate our attention on human capital accu-
mulation, i.e. education and health7 since any realistic estimation of 
the capital related mechanisms would need to build up specifications 
of the economic openness characteristics of A and B that we seek to 
avoid at this stage. Moreover, since we are looking at the development 
in the long run the ‘stock’ effect of violence on education tends to 
cumulate over time: when violence decreases education at period t , 
less educated labor power is available to teach students in period 1t  
(Barrera and Ibanez, 2004).  
 
Not only does violence affect education, it also affects the health of 
workers and the life cycle of the whole population.8 Crime can also 
hamper the long run development by affecting children: childhood and 
                                                 
5  Again reverse causality effects may be present: less lighting make crime more easy to 
perform. 
6  In a number of surveys where business leaders have been asked about what they consider 
their most serious problem, regular crime has come surprisingly high on their list (World 
Bank, 2005). Note that some of the relevant crime will not be recorded in the crime vic-
timization data since crime directed against enterprises have only been recorde for a few 
countries. Some of that will be registered in the household questionnaires. Moreover it is 
reasonable to assume that the correlation between household and enterprise experienced 
crime rates are positive and pretty strong.  
7  This importance of human capital accumulation is supported by the international commu-
nities and aid donors during the last decades. This is strongly emphasized in the ambitious 
UN Millennium Development Goals, aiming at curbing poverty by 50% by the end of 
2015. Governments in developing countries are increasingly urged to raise education 
quantitatively and qualitatively, to reduce child mortality rates and such.  
8  Soares (2005) found that on average 1 year of life expectancy lost to violence is associ-
ated with a yearly social cost of 3.8% of GDP. 
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adolescence are the critical stages of the accumulation of human capi-
tal assets (Heinemann and Verner, 2006). In addition to the impact on 
the traditional economic welfare measures we focus here, crime has 
strong effects on more diffuse, but equally important aspects of human 
welfare, feelings of insecurity, even fear.  
 
Here we will only look at and test the following hypotheses: Crime 
affects negatively the long run development (hypothesis 1). Crime in-
directly affects development through human capital accumulation (hy-
pothesis 2). 
1.2. Crime victimization, police corruption and development 
Ideally the role of police in the society is to reduce the incidence of 
crime (Andvig and Fjeldstad (2008), providing security to the popula-
tions, protecting them from private expropriation; robbery, etc. Pre-
sumably police corruption is likely to increase crime rates in different 
ways: 1) it will increase the scale economies of crime organizations, 
2) increase the relative return of any single crime to a non-crime ac-
tion.9 Despite these plausible mechanisms it has proved difficult to 
establish firm empirical evidence. In a study based on the same basic 
data as this paper Azfar and Gurgur (2008) show that while there are 
indeed close connection between police corruption and different forms 
of crime,10 that police corruption appears to increase crime, effects of 
police corruption on crime rates are not firmly established. Hence, the 
approach here to look at the effects of police corruption and crime on 
development in isolation makes sense. What kind of mechanisms 
might then lead from police corruption to development that doesn’t 
work through the crime rate? Apart from the consequences due to the 
interactions with criminal activities, police corruption may have its 
own separate effects on development, and then through its links to 
corruption in general. To some degree corruption in the police simply 
follows the overall level in the administration, but it also has a specific 
effect. After all corruption is a crime to be policed by the police. A 
corrupt police will increase the corruption in general and thereby have 
a separate effect on development. Andvig and Fjeldstad (2008) docu-
mented mechanisms through which police corruption may affect de-
                                                 
9  As argued in Andvig and Fjeldstad (2008) the police may earn corrupt income through 
either extortion of innocents or through bribes from the guilty. The relative return of 
crime increases. 
10  In their paper they show that the citizens’ (households’) crime reporting is also interlinked 
with their crime and corruption experiences in interesting ways. Despite this and because 
we have focus on potential macroeconomic effects of crime, we have refrained from 
bringing the rate of crime reporting into our analysis.  
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velopment11: direct illegal taxation of foreign trade, of the informal 
urban economy, and of transport in rural areas.12  
 
The following hypotheses will be tested: police corruption contributes 
to increase the adverse effects of crime on development (hypothesis 
3); police corruption per se will adversely affect the economic devel-
opment (hypothesis 4). 
 
                                                 
11  For an microeconometric analysis of how police corruption affect the poor people, see 
Hunt and Laszlo (2007) and Hunt (2008).  
12  To name but few, Nissen (2005) reported police extortion cases in rural Cambodia. Also, 
several witnesses on police extortion in urban India were published in the Hindu (10 may 
2003). 
2. Empirical analysis 
2.1. Data presentation  
The empirical analyses of the paper are based on the International 
Crime Victimization Surveys13 that contains information about both 
police corruption and various forms of crime. Great efforts have been 
made to define the crime types in the same way across countries and 
years. The surveys like ICVS are likely to be more valid than the po-
lice-reported data in a cross country context (Azfar and Gurgur, 
2008a) since the police reported data are more strongly influenced by 
the reporting process of police organizations. That may vary strongly 
across countries. The official crime data reported by police are af-
fected by two problems in developing countries: the under-reporting 
bias of police and the unwillingness of victims to reports crime to the 
police (Soares, 2004; Scorzafave and Soares, 2009).14 Victimization 
surveys have been judged as “the primary workhorse for measuring 
crime” (Glaeser, 1999) even for developed countries.15 Further, with 
respect to corruption, our choice is reinforced by the argument of au-
thors (see Roubaud and Razafindrakoto, 2006, Abramo, 2007) who 
claim that street reports of corruption or local populations facing more 
often bribery are likely to be less biased than the perception of interna-
tional experts. 
 
The present study takes advantage of the data for crime and police 
corruption from the latest integrated International Crime Victim sur-
veys (ICVS) data compiled by van Kesteren (2007). Even though se-
rious efforts had been made to ensure comparability across countries, 
these efforts are too costly to be made yearly and for each country. 
Hence, the data are available only for five waves: 1989, 1992, 1996, 
2000/2002 and 2004/2005. In total 74 countries are covered (see ap-
                                                 
13  For a detailed description of crime victimization data, see van Dijk(2008), Chatterjee and 
Ray (2009). Fajnzylber et al (2002) also describes the main sources of crime data.  
14  The correlation between the official police reported crime rates and the crime experience 
rates appears to be only weak (Gibson and Kim, 2006).  
15  Obviously, there are some weaknesses of the ICVS data. Andvig and Shrivastava (2009) 
drew attention on the most important. 1) Unlike the developed countries, the samples 
drawn from the developing countries are taken from the largest city(ies) only. Since crime 
rates on average are higher in cities, this may lead to an overestimation of crime rates in 
poorer countries. 2) The surveys performed in the collection of country surveys that we 
rely on, have been made at widely varying points of time. 3) Citizens report of crime in 
the surveys may systematically deviate from the actual experiences when the respondents 
try to manipulate the outcomes for one reason or another. 4) Although a lot of care has 
been made to formulate the questions in exactly the same manner, crime and corruption 
are exceptionally sensitive subjects that make the survey responses exceptionally exposed 
to systematic, but unknown environmental influences that may give very different rate 
outcomes from two seemingly identical surveys performed in the same country and close 
in time.  
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pendix 1 for the full list of countries).16 Of the 74 countries, the first 
wave covers only 13 (developed) countries, the second wave 28 coun-
tries, the third wave 44 countries, the fourth wave 46 countries and the 
fifth wave 34 countries. Hence, not all countries are covered in each 
wave: about 65% of the sample had been covered by only 1 or 2 
waves. The composition of the sample in the different geographic re-
gions is presented in appendix A2. It is clear that ICVS cover more the 
developed countries (West Europe, USA and Canada, Australia) than 
the developing countries (Africa, Latin America and Asia). 
 
Measurement of crime rates17  
The construction of the crime rate index is based on the questions ask-
ing surveyed populations if they have been victims of [crime type] 
during the last two years. For each ICVS wave and a given country, 
the aggregate crime rate is measured as the simple average proportion 
of surveyed populations who were victims of any types of crime. The 
following types of crime are considered in this study: theft of cars and 
motorcycles, theft from cars, car vandalism, theft of personal proper-
ties, burglary, robbery and assault. Attempts of these types of crime 
are also included in our calculations.18 
 
Measurement of police corruption 
Corruption is difficult to measure because its activities are developed 
secretly. At macroeconomic level, only perception indexes are avail-
able. The present work exploits the data from the International Crime 
Victim surveys to measure police corruption. Here, respondents report 
their experience in paying bribe in public administrations: 
 
“In some countries, there is a problem of corruption among government or public 
officials. During the [year the survey was conducted], has any government offi-
cial, for instance, a police officer or inspector in your country asked you, or ex-
pected you to pay bribe for his or her services?”  
 
As for crime rates, the police corruption is measured as averages in 
each country. In other words, for each ICVS wave, the police corrup-
tion measures the proportion of individuals in a given country who 
paid bribe to the police over the last twelve months previous to the 
surveys. 
                                                 
16  In fact the ICVS data cover four other countries: England and Wales, Northern Ireland, 
Scotland and Yugoslavia. For the purpose of this study, they are excluded because we are 
unable to merge other macroeconomic aggregates to them.  
17  For the definition and source of all variables used in the paper see appendix 3.  
18  Homicides and sex crimes are not considered in the following despite their importance. 
For obvious reason a direct victim of a homicide is unable to report the incident. Although 
household members may, the relationship between the crime incidences and the sample of 
respondents will have to differ for this crime. Sex crimes are more likely not be reported 
even in this form of questionnaire and its degree of reporting to vary strongly across coun-
tries so the ICVS data will be more difficult to interpret for these kinds of crime. As dis-
cussed later, the advantage of using an overall crime index in some situations is to reduce 
the erratic component in the answers to any single questions in a questionnaire and to 
smooth over cultural differences in the degree of reporting each single form of crime.  
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Crime rates and police corruption are calculated on a scale from 0 to 
100. 
2.2. Descriptive statistics 
Figure 1 show the average crime victimization rates and police corrup-
tion for different groups of countries. We note that crime rate and po-
lice corruption averages vary widely from one wave to another for the 
same group of countries. While a part of these variations could be ex-
plained by actual changes in crime or police corruption levels or shift 
in the crime protection technology, it might be also due to characteris-
tics of the questionnaire instrument itself: variation in the composition 
of the ICVS, variable responses of respondents or different ways to 
introduce the questionnaire from one wave to another. On the other 
hand, we have no reason to believe that actual crime patterns for a 
country may stay stable for more than a decade as we by implication 
have to assume to keep the sample of countries sufficiently large. In 
fact, in the period 1995-2005 one can observe a significant change (a 
decline) in crime rates in Europe (and in the United States, Van Dijk, 
2008). The decline in the USA has led to much theorizing, but the si-
multaneous decline in Europe has thrown doubts on most of it. As far 
as police corruption is concerned, presumably, the reported instances 
of police corruption in developed countries are so low that the erratic 
component of the responses may be very large. 
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Figure 1- Crime and police in different continents and waves 
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To deal these weaknesses and the erratic nature of the data, our analy-
ses are based on averages,19 over the period 1989-2005. That is, for 
each country, we calculate the averages taking advantage of all data 
made available when merging the five ICVS waves during the whole 
period 1989-2005. Figure 2 below show positive correlations20 be-
tween the different types of crime (see appendix A4 for their descrip-
tive statistics).  
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Figure 2- Crime types correlations 
 
Table 1 displays the average proportion of populations who were vic-
tims of crime rate, police corruption in different groups of countries 
for the period 1989-2005. Standard deviations are in the parentheses. 
The number of developed countries surveyed has been higher than de-
veloping ones. On average crime incidence rate is higher in African 
and Latin America countries. Crime rates are lowest in Western 
Europe, with an average representing less than 50% of the crime rates 
observed in Africa or Latin America. Asian countries and East Euro-
pean countries have similar average crime rates, which is significantly 
different from the average of Africa or Latin America.21 
                                                 
19  Using the averages for the whole period reduces the volatility associated with the compo-
sition of the sample for each country. In addition, it makes it possible to correct for the ar-
tificially-high-and-low variations in the victimization rates. Even so, we expect measure-
ment errors in the data. 
20  In each cell, the scatter plots show the correlation trend between the variable labeled in 
the top along the diagonal and the variable on the right-side along the diagonal. 
21  The relative low score of poor Asian countries and the high score of Latin American 
countries suggest that any relationship between crime and development may be influenced 
by some set of cultural or income distribution mechanisms. We control for these factors in 
our regressions. 
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Obviously, average statistics hide disparities among countries. Among 
the ten countries with the highest crime rates in the world, five come 
from Africa. The highest crime rate (11.6) is observed in Colombia, 
followed by Zimbabwe (9.5). In Western Europe countries and Asian 
countries, crime rates are low: Hong Kong (1.4), Azerbaijan (1.5) and 
Japan (1.7) have the lowest crime rates in the world.  
 
Statistics displayed in table 1 show that the highest proportion of 
population who pay bribe to the police is observed in Latin America. 
This is surprising since the average for African countries, generally 
considered as the most corrupt in the world, is lower (2.84) even 
though the variability is higher than Latina America. However, Nige-
ria has the highest police corruption. Among the ten countries with the 
highest police corruption rate, three are from Africa (Nigeria, Mo-
zambique and Uganda), three from Latin America (Bolivia, Mexico 
and Colombia), three from East Europe (Russia, Croatia and Kir-
gizstan), and one from Asia (Cambodia). Police corruption is very low 
if not completely absent in Western Europe countries and other devel-
oped countries. 
 
The relationship between crime rate and police corruption is described 
in Figure 1. The two variables are positively correlated.22 
 
Table 1: Average crime and police corruption rates in different groups of countries 
 
 Crime rate Police Corruption 
Africa (N=12) (a) 7.29 2.84 
 (1.67) (4.44) 
Asia (N=11) (b) 4.22 1.90 
 (2.65) (2.16) 
East Europe (N=20) (c) 4.75 2.90 
 (1.12) (1.88) 
Latin America (N=9) 7.14 4.70 
 (2.35) (3.64) 
Western Europe (N=18) 3.32 0.12 
 (0.78) (0.19) 
Other (N=4) 4.29 0.03 
 (0.25) (0.03) 
All countries (N=74) 5.00 2.13 
 (2.17) (2.88) 
 
The p-value of the two-tail t-test of the mean difference between Africa and Latin 
America is 0.875. (b) The p-value of the two-tail test of the mean difference be-
tween Africa and Asia is 0.0045. (c) The p-value of the two-tail t-test of the mean 
difference between East Europe and Asia is 0.5347.  
 
 
                                                 
22  The correlation coefficient is 0.39 and significant at 1% level.  
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Figure 3- Crime and police corruption correlation 
2.3. Main econometric results 
2.3.1. OLS estimates 
So far, we hypothesized that both crime and police corruption are 
likely to have negative effects on the level of development. The pur-
pose of the econometric analysis is to explore whether this may be 
confirmed from the data and to estimate the eventual strengths of the 
impact of crime and police corruption on the level of development.  
 
As shown in the previous section, for each country the ICVS waves 
cover different time periods, which are not adjacent. Furthermore, 
there is a wide variation in the composition of countries samples cov-
ered by each ICVS wave as well as individual countries samples. All 
these problems make it difficult to conduct panel data analysis. The 
econometric analyses rely therefore on cross-country average over the 
whole period 1990-2004. By reducing the measurement errors in the 
ICVS data, the averaging allows us to generate more accurate esti-
mates of our coefficients of interest.23  
 
The dependent variable is the log of real GDP per capita, which come 
from Penn World tables 6.2 computed by Heston et al (2006). 24 The 
                                                 
23  One inconvenient of this approach is to affect the strength of the relationship between 
crime, police corruption and the level of development if the inter-temporal variation is not 
merely noise.  
24  Alternative measures of GDP are used to check the robustness of our results in section 4.  
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level of GDP captures the differences in the long-run process of eco-
nomic development. We seek to explain differences across countries 
which are not just transitory (see Easterly et al, 1993; Hall and Hones, 
1999). The equation estimated is as follows:  
 
 iikkiii xpolcrimeLogy   210   (1) 
ikX  is a set of control variables (discussed below) that are related to 
the ‘deep’ determinants of economic performance (geography), human 
capital accumulation factors (education and health), the quality of in-
stitutions, the social factors and the economic characteristics (informal 
sector). The impact of these variables on the level of development is 
well established in the literature. Their omission could lead to bias in 
the coefficient of police corruption and crime variables since they are 
plausibly correlated with crime and corruption. 
 
Our econometric procedure consists of four steps: (i) Estimate the im-
pacts of crime and police corruption on the level of development, 
holding other factors constant. (ii) Assess the indirect effects of crime, 
focusing on police corruption, education and life expectancy. (iii) 
Next, two dimensions of crime are considered: the violent crime and 
the property crime. (iv) Tests of robustness are finally conducted. 
 
The scatter plots in figure 4 show a negative correlation between both 
average crime rate and police corruption and GDP per capita25. That 
is, countries with low crime rate (or low police corruption) like West-
ern Europe countries have high level of GDP per capita while coun-
tries with high crime rates (or high police corruption) in Africa or 
Latin America have low GDP per capita. 
 
                                                 
25  The correlation coefficient between crime and GDP is -0.54. The correlation coefficient 
between police corruption and GDP per capita is -0.49. Both coefficients are significant at 
1% level.  
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Figure 4. Correlation between crime and police corruption and GDP 
per capita 
 
The ordinary least squares (OLS) estimates go beyond the simple cor-
relation, taking into account the other determinants of economic per-
formance. Several specifications are tested so as to take into account 
the correlation among some right-side variables. We include the fol-
lowing sets of control variables. (1) Geographic variables: Many stud-
ies have argued for a direct effect of geographic factors on economic 
performance (Hall and Jones, 1999; Gallup et al, 1999; Acemoglu et 
al, 2001; Rodrik et al, 2004). Climate, endowment of natural re-
sources, disease burden can exert strong influence on the agricultural 
productivity and the quality of human capital. We use three variables 
to control for geography: the absolute value of latitude, dummies for 
the landlocked countries, and dummies for tropical countries. All three 
variables can be considered as exogenous (see Rodrik et al, 2004). (2) 
As far as human capital accumulation is concerned, we use the total 
years of education in the population (over 25 year) and the life expec-
tancy at birth26. (3) Furthermore, police corruption and crime are 
mostly hidden activities although they pop up to some degree in the 
victimization surveys. They take place mainly in the shadow economy 
preponderant in developing countries and developed countries as well. 
We control therefore for the informal economy. Finally, we include 
                                                 
26  It doesn’t matter whether we use life expectancy or infant mortality rate. Using the infant 
mortality rate under five instead of life expectancy makes no significant difference in our 
coefficients estimates. The results are displayed in appendix 7. 
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also regional dummies for Africa, Latin America, East Europe-Asia 
since there are reasons to suspect that crime levels are influenced by 
spontaneous processes that vary across continents. West Europe and 
other continents are the omitted group  
 
OLS results are reported in table 2. In order to highlight the main 
channels through which crime affects the economic performance, we 
report in the first column the coefficient estimate when crime rate is 
the only independent variable. This coefficient is negative and signifi-
cant. The magnitude of crime’s coefficient decreases once we intro-
duce the police corruption in the model in column (2). The R2 in col-
umn (2) suggests that 38% of the variation of income per capita is as-
sociated with the variation of the crime rate index and police corrup-
tion. This result emphasizes on the one hand the interaction between 
police corruption and crime (cf. Azfar and Turgur, 2008a; Kugler et 
al, 2005, Gaviria, 2002) and on the other hand the indirect effect of 
crime through police corruption. The coefficient of crime simultane-
ously with the police corruption’s coefficient continues to decrease 
when we introduce the geographic variables, the regional dummies, 
and both cease to be significant when we control for human capital 
variables (column 5)27. In the next columns (6-7), we control respec-
tively for the Gini coefficient and the informal sector. The informal 
sector has a negative impact on  economic performance. The Gini co-
efficient  is not significant. The main conclusion we can draw from 
the results in columns (6) through (7), is that even though the coeffi-
cient of crime is considerably reduced, it still remains significant 
while the coefficient of police corruption becomes non-significant. 
                                                 
27  This result reflects the interactions between corruption and education and health out-
comes. At macro level, Gupta et al (2001) found a negative effect of corruption on the 
provision of education and health care. For country studies, Reinikka and Svenssion 
(2001) reported large leakages funds allocated to education and health in Uganda and 
Tanzania cases. Azfar and Turgur (2008b) found negative effects of corruption on health 
outcomes (immunization rates, vaccinations of newborns, etc.) in Philippines. 
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Table 2: Crime, police corruption and level of development: OLS re-
gressions 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS 
Average 
crime rate 
-
0.252*** 
-
0.193*** 
-0.102* -0.121** 0.0208 -0.149** -
0.136*** 
 (-4.760) (-3.413) (-1.749) (-2.038) (0.627) (-2.045) (-2.727) 
Police cor-
ruption  
 -
0.115*** 
-0.0871** -0.0677** -0.0318 -
0.110*** 
-0.0491 
  (-3.225) (-2.491) (-2.623) (-1.215) (-2.885) (-1.302) 
Latitude   0.0338*** 0.0297*** 0.0139**   
   (3.410) (3.571) (2.515)   
Dummy for 
tropical 
region 
  0.295 0.0555 0.0355   
   (0.779) (0.154) (0.141)   
Dummy for 
landlocked 
countries 
  -0.264 -0.240 0.164   
   (-0.982) (-1.359) (0.984)   
Dummy 
Africa 
   -0.544    
    (-1.372)    
Dummy 
Latin Amer-
ica 
   0.382    
    (1.156)    
East Europe 
and Asia  
   -0.908***    
    (-4.787)    
Education     0.0594*   
     (1.908)   
Life expec-
tancy 
    0.0430***   
     (2.873)   
Urbanization 
rate 
    0.0121**   
     (2.658)   
Gini Index      -0.0157  
      (-1.405)  
Informal 
economy 
      -
0.030*** 
       (-4.053) 
Constant 10.14*** 10.10*** 8.357*** 8.985*** 4.372*** 10.46*** 10.56*** 
 (37.51) (38.47) (14.38) (20.74) (4.294) (30.62) (39.98) 
Observations 72 72 65 65 49 68 68 
R-squared 0.291 0.382 0.554 0.757 0.877 0.383 0.508 
 
Notes: All regressions are OLS. Robust t-statistics in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The 
dependent variable is the log of the average real GDP per capita over 1980-2004. Crime rate (and police 
corruption) are calculated as average proportion of populations who were victims of types of crimes such 
theft, robbery, assault or burglary (and police corruption). The original data come from the integrated ICVS 
including all waves for each country over the period 1989-2005. See appendix A3 for more detailed vari-
ables definition and sources.  
 
 
2.3.2. Instrumental variables approach 
In the OLS estimates, we assume that there is no correlation between 
police corruption, crime rates and the error terms. The results obtained 
could be not interpreted satisfactorily as causal because of potential 
endogeneity problem. Llyod-Ellis and Marceau (2003) argue that 
there is an endogenous dynamic relationship between insecurity and 
development. It has been shown by previous economic analysis of 
crime that the level of development affects it (Bourguignon, 1999; 
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2001), but a number of studies of reverse causality has been heavily 
influenced by measurement errors (Soares, 2004). Increased GDP de-
creases crime but increases the rate of reported crime. Hence the ob-
served effect will underestimate the negative effect on actual crime. 
Omitted variables and measurement errors can also cause OLS to be 
biased and inconsistent. To address the endogeneity problem, we ap-
ply a two-stage estimation procedure. Here we use the Generalized 
Method of Moments (GMM) which is more efficient than the standard 
instrumental variables in the presence of heteroskedasticity and non 
normal and non independent errors (Baum et al, 2003).  
 
The identification strategy relies on instruments, some of which have 
already been demonstrated to be “valid” for corruption and crime.28 
Our instruments for police corruption include the British legal origin 
(british),29 the proportion of Catholics (catho), Protestants (prot) and 
Muslims (musl) in 1980 (La porta et al, 1999). We will expect the le-
gal origin to have a stronger imprint on the police and judiciary sys-
tem than most other public institutions. One legacy of former colonies 
is the institution of military and the structure of the police. Contempo-
raneous police organizations in African or Asia countries are in most 
of the cases based either on a British model or a French model. Re-
garding religion, we may expect countries with large proportion of 
muslims and catholics to increase corruption in general (see also 
Treisman, 2000; Paldam, 2002)  
 
Our instruments for crime rates are based on three sets of factors. 
First, we use crime victimization rate in the five previous years (lag-
crime) as instruments.3031 The second instrument concerns the abor-
tion law status (abort). Legal abortion rights have been found to be 
negatively correlated with crime in USA (see Donohue and Levitt, 
2001).32 The third instrument we try is related to culture: the trust 
(trust) and cultural difference. The higher the degree to which people 
can trust in others in the society, the lower is the probability that they 
                                                 
28  We do not pretend to build sound theories explaining the relationship between these in-
struments and the endogenous variables. The instruments mainly intend to identify an ex-
ogenous source of variation of our independent variables of interest. Cf. Rodrik et al 
(2004) “An instrument does not a theory make”.  
29  We include only British legal origin because our sample doesn’t cover many countries 
with French or other legal origins. 
30  This variable is also taken from the ICVS. It is calculated based on the question asking if 
respondents were victims of crime over the lat 5 years. 
31  If a respondent report of recent crime experience is influenced by her past experience the 
lagged crime variable is only a weak instrument since it is also likely to affect the con-
temporary income per capita. The over-identification restrictions tests on the other addi-
tional instruments, more exogenous, allow us to rely on the instrumental variable results.  
32  Based on anecdotal empirical facts, Donohue and Levitt (2001, pp.386-389) have pro-
vided a number of theoretical mechanisms through which the abortion legalization can af-
fect the crime rate. We find them hardly convincing. Crime data from Europe showed a 
simultaneous decline there without any significant changes in abortion rights. Neverthe-
less legalized abortion may catch a number of cultural factors that may influence law-
making and other mechanisms that have impact on crime. 
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are victim of crime (see Azfar and Turgur, 2008).33 Cultural dimen-
sion is also captured through the Hofstede’s Power Distance index 
(pdi), which measures the extent to which the less powerful members 
of organizations and institutions accept and expect that power is dis-
tributed unequally. Large cultural difference can be source of conflict.  
 
In the first stage regressions, crime and police are regressed on these 
instruments and all the exogenous variables.  
 
iikkiii zpdiabortiontrustlagcrimecrime   43210  (2) 
iikkiiii zmuslprotcathobritishpol   43210  (3) 
 
Results from the GMM regressions are reported in table 3.34 Apart 
from the Hansen test in column (1), the validity of our instruments can 
be “reasonably” accepted. The partial R2s shows a strong correlation 
between the instruments and the endogenous variables.35 Column (1) 
shows the coefficient estimate of the impact of crime when the other 
variables are excluded from the model. The significance of this coeffi-
cient disappears once we include additional variables. Adding police 
corruption in column (2) or the geography variables in column (3) 36 
or human capital accumulation column (5) reduce considerably the 
magnitude and the significance of the crime’s coefficient. We con-
clude from these results that crime does not have any significant direct 
impact on the economic performance.  
 
Due to the fact that crime coefficient’s significance seems to disappear 
when police corruption is introduced in most of specifications, one 
may question whether crime and police corruption are not capturing 
the same phenomenon. Even though crime and police corruption can 
both be considered as forms of social disorder, our results suggest that 
                                                 
33  Again reverse effects, that is, from crime to trust are, of course, potentially significant. 
34  It is noteworthy that the coefficients of crime (column 1) and police corruption (column 2) 
are higher than those obtained from the OLS estimates. The coefficient of the crime vari-
able is positive and not significant from column (2) and then. Such results suggest that the 
OLS estimates suffer from attenuation bias (due to the measurement errors) or that poten-
tial sources of positive bias due to simultaneity or omitted variables strongly dominate 
those creating negative bias.  
35  The F-tests in all regression allow us not to accept the hypothesis that the set of excluded 
instruments significantly correlated with each endogenous variable. See also appendix 6 
the scatter plots displaying the correlations between crime, police corruption and their in-
struments. The Durbin-Wu-Hausman tests confirm the endogeneity of crime and police 
corruption in five out of the seven specifications.  
36  The coefficient of the landlocked dummy in column (4), counterintuitive, must be inter-
preted with caution. Only four countries (Hungary, Switzerland, Austria and Luxem-
bourg) are included in this specific regression. The positive coefficient reflects simply the 
higher economic performance of these countries compared to the others, after controlling 
for the regional characteristics. Estimating the specified model in column 4 excluding 
these countries and without the landlocked dummy does not alter our results (results 
available upon request). 
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they are two different phenomena. Indeed, crime and police corruption 
seem to have different impact on the level of development. While the 
coefficients of police corruption are still significant in columns (2) and 
(3), (6) and (7) crime does not have any additional power in explain-
ing the level of development, and even so when we exclude police 
corruption from our regressions. Combined with the OLS estimates, 
we can fairly conclude that police corruption exert a direct significant 
adverse influence on the level of development. But how plausible are 
our estimates? The estimates in column (3) suggest that a 1% increase 
in police corruption, evaluated at the world average (2.13) cause the 
income per capita to decrease by 0.58%. Let us compare two coun-
tries, Nigeria which has the highest police corruption in our sample 
(12.8) to the Czech Republic with a level of police corruption (2.3) 
that is close to the world average. If Nigeria reduces its police corrup-
tion to the Czech’s level, its real income per capita should increase by 
2.9 percentage point. This effect is however less than the actual in-
come gap between the two countries (2.54 log difference). That it is, 
the magnitude of police corruption impact is considerable. This result 
is consistent with previous studies such Mauro (1995)37 and Mo 
(2001).38 However, our estimates are not directly comparable to theirs. 
One reason is that our measure of police corruption is the proportion 
of population victims to bribery by the police instead of a perception 
index. In addition, their dependent variable is the average growth rate, 
which is capturing only the short-term income differences between 
countries. We are rather interested in the long-run development. 
                                                 
37  Mauro found that a one-standard-deviation improvement in bureaucratic efficiency (their 
measure of corruption) is associated with a 1.3 (0.8) percentage point increase in the an-
nual growth rate of GDP per capita (table 7, p.702, columns 5 and 6). 
38  Mo (2001) found that their OLS estimations that 1% increase in the corruption level re-
duces the growth rate by 0.72% (table 2, p.72, column 1). Their IV estimations suggest 
that a 1% increase in the corruption level reduces the growth rate by 0.69% ( table 8, p.77 
column 1). 
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Table 3: Crime, police corruption and level of development: IV regressions 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 GMM GMM GMM GMM GMM GMM GMM 
        
Average crime 
rate 
-
0.295*** 
0.188 0.135 -0.0199 0.00921 0.175 0.0979 
 (-3.385) (1.631) (1.289) (-0.281) (0.285) (1.533) (1.279) 
 -
0.387*** 
-0.274*** -0.0202 0.0531 -
0.335*** 
-0.240** Police corrup-
tion 
(POLCOR)  (-4.155) (-3.305) (-0.352) (1.135) (-3.558) (-2.650) 
Latitude   0.0320*** 0.0241*** 0.0150***   
   (3.155) (3.339) (2.905)   
Dummy for 
tropical region 
  0.0604 -0.271 -0.0233   
   (0.120) (-0.796) (-0.114)   
  0.429* 0.283*** 0.0767   Dummy for 
landlocked 
countries 
  (1.942) (2.773) (0.386)   
Dummy Af-
rica 
   -1.120**    
    (-2.399)    
Dummy Latin 
America 
   -0.0708    
    (-0.161)    
East Europe 
and Asia  
   -1.051***    
    (-6.585)    
Life expec-
tancy 
    0.0772***   
     (3.508)   
Education     0.0832**   
     (2.118)   
Urbanization 
rate 
    0.00491   
     (1.057)   
Gini Index      -0.00255  
      (-0.185)  
Informal 
economy 
      -
0.036*** 
       (-3.785) 
Constant 10.67*** 9.268*** 7.829*** 8.853*** 2.111 9.337*** 10.16*** 
 (29.07) (22.11) (12.69) (24.19) (1.533) (16.66) (26.28) 
Observations 44 43 41 41 34 42 41 
R-squared 0.127 -0.479 0.193 0.794 0.824 -0.311 0.253 
Hansen J 
statistic  
15.57 7.263 6.694 4.365 7.263 9.584 10.04 
(p-value) ns 0.297 0.350 0.627 0.297 0.143 0.123 
Partial R2 
crime; police 
0.,93 0.93; 
0.36 
0.92; 0.33 0.92; 0.24 0.996; 
0.39 
0.92; 
0.30 
0.92; 
0.24 
Shea partial 
R2 crime; 
police corrup-
tion  
0.92 0.55; 
0.21 
0.79; 0.29 0.88; 0.23 0.80; 0.33 0.77; 
0.25 
0.74; 
0.19 
 
Notes: All regressions are two step instrumental variables, implemented in Stata using ivreg2 with robust, gmm 
and small options. Robust t-statistics in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The dependent variable is 
the log of the average real GDP per capita over 1980-2004. Crime and police corruption are the two endogenous 
variables Crime rate (and police corruption) are calculated as average proportion of populations who were vic-
tims of types of crimes such theft, robbery, assault or burglary (and bribery in police). The original data come 
from the integrated ICVS including all waves for each country over the period 1989-2005. The list of instru-
ments for crime includes the lagged crime, the abortion law status, the level of trust in the society, the cultural 
dimension captured by by the Hofstede’s power distance index. The list of instruments of police corruption 
includes the British legal origin, the proportion of Catholics, protestants and Muslims in 1980. For more detailed 
variables definition and sources see appendix A3  
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2.4. Indirect effects of average crime rate and its interactions 
with police corruption 
In the previous section, we have found that crime does not directly 
affect economic development. Why not?  Here we explore the possi-
bility that the influence works indirectly. Doing that, crime’s impact 
on other variables makes these mask its impact on economic devel-
opment. To answer our question we need to identify the main indirect 
channels through which crime and police corruption influence eco-
nomic performance.  
 
The channels investigated here are level of education (educ), life ex-
pectancy (life), urbanization rate (urb) and police corruption (police). 
The indirect effects working through these intermediate variables are 
estimated using the specification in column (5) of table 3. The method 
consists of two steps. First, we estimate the impact of crime on each of 
the candidate intervening variable (xi).  
 
 iiii crimex   0   (4) 
 
In estimating the impact of crime on the candidate variable, we treat 
crime as endogenous. Results from the GMM estimations are dis-
played in table 4. The Hansen tests not do reject the validity of our 
instruments, which are the previous ones used in the GDP per capita 
specifications.  
 
Table 4: Effects of crime on police corruption and development factors 
 
 
Crime has adverse effects on education and life expectancy. Increas-
ing crime rate of 1 point reduces the total years of education by 0.31 
and  life expectancy by 4.7 years. Crime does not significantly affect 
the urbanization rate. Unlike Azfar and Turgur (2008a), we find that 
crime rates increase police corruption: an increase of crime rate of 1 
point increases police corruption by 1.02. Since education and life ex-
pectancy increase GDP per capita (see table 3 above), one may con-
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Police corrup-
tion 
Education Life expec-
tancy 
Urbanization 
rate 
     
Average crime rate 1.017** -0.306** -4.679*** -4.251 
 (2.677) (-2.032) (-3.378) (-1.469) 
Constant -2.863* 7.756*** 92.46*** 85.28*** 
 (-1.887) (10.24) (17.01) (6.850) 
     
Observations 45 40 45 45 
R-squared 0.143 0.057 -0.261 -0.127 
Hansen J statistic 4.302 3.984 1.824 2.460 
p-value of Hansen J statistic 0.116 0.136 0.402 0.292 
Robust t-statistics in parenthe-
ses 
    
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1     
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clude from these results that indirect effects of crime through these 
two channels are necessarily negative. Inserting equation (4) in (1), it 
follows straightforward that the indirect effect of crime is equal to:  
 
 iIViidcrime    (5) 
 
ΒiIV are the direct impact (coefficient from column (5)) of each chan-
nel on GDP per capita. To test the significance of indirect effects, we 
need to compute the standard error of ii . As discussed by Preacher 
and Hayes (2008), there are several methods for testing indirect ef-
fects. Most of these methods are based on the product-of-coefficients 
approach (Sobel, 1982; 1986 quoted by Preacher and Hayes), where 
the standard error is computed using the normal distribution. How-
ever, it is possible that both the specific and the total indirect effect are 
not normally distributed (Preacher and Hayes, 2008). In addition, 
when the test involve multiple mechanisms, it is possible that specific 
indirect effects ii  are significant even if the total indirect effect is 
non significant. Indeed, the product-of-coefficients approach from the 
baseline sample cannot appropriately handle this problem. In order to 
cope with these problems, we use a bootstrap approach. To bootstrap 
the sampling distribution of the specific and total indirect effects, we 
take a sample of size n observations with replacement from the origi-
nal sample. Each observation can be selected as part of a bootstrap 
sample not at all, once, twice, or even multiple times. Using this new 
resample of size n (initially 74 in our study), we estimate i and i  
and then calculate i i   and i i  . This process is repeated k times, 
yielding k estimates of the total and specific indirect effects.  
 
The estimates reported in table 5 are based on more than 7200 repli-
cates. The significance of the coefficients is determined from the per-
centile confidence intervals (PCIs) and bias-corrected bootstrap inter-
vals (BCIs). Several results deserve attention. The total indirect im-
pact of crime is negative and significant. Combined with the non-
significant direct effect of crime, we conclude that crime affect the 
level of development mainly through indirect mechanisms. Thus, if 
crime rate increase by 1% point, the log of real GDP per capita is ex-
pected to decrease by 0.65. The indirect effect through education is 
non significant. That is, crime does not exert any influence through 
education. Of the total indirect effects, 42% is exerted through life ex-
pectancy, 13.48% through urbanization rate and 44.42%.though police 
corruption.  
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Table 5: Indirect effects of crime 
 
 Observed Coefficients 
and standard errors 
  
Indirect effect of education 0.006 
[0.024] 
Indirect effect life expec-
tancy 
-0.273** 
[0.135] 
Indirect effect urbanization -0.088** 
[0.044] 
Indirect effect police cor-
ruption 
-0.295*** 
[0.093] 
Total indirect effect -0.660*** 
[0.161] 
Total direct effect of crime 0.082 
[0.069] 
Total direct effect of police 
corruption 
-0.290*** 
[0.117] 
 
10000 bootstrap replicates. Due to the convergence 
conditions, coefficient estimates and standard error 
estimates include only 7294 complete replicates. Boot-
strap standard Errors are in the brackets. *** p<0.01, ** 
p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
In addition to estimating the indirect effect, the bootstrap method al-
lows us to test the robustness of the direct effect of crime and police 
corruption. Results displayed in table 5 also suggest that crime does 
not have direct impact on the level of development. While this result 
is not strongly favorable to the hypothesis 1, the indirect effects 
through human capital accumulation and police corruption do lend 
support to hypotheses 2 and 3 respectively. On the other hand police 
corruption has significant adverse direct impact on the level of devel-
opment39 (hypothesis 4).  
                                                 
39  It is plausible that police corruption like crime exerts indirect effects through general de-
velopment factors. When we examine the extent to which eventual effects are transmitted 
to the economic performance, we found  that the negative impact of police corruption is 
not significantly transmitted through development factors such education, life expectancy, 
or urbanization. Nevertheless, we found that the indirect impact of police corruption may 
significantly be transmitted through the size of the informal economy. Results are avail-
able upon request. 
3. Violent crime versus property 
crimes 
3.1. Direct impact of violence crime and property crime on 
development 
In the previous analysis we have used an overall crime index to meas-
ure the level of criminal activities.40 Nevertheless, the relative preva-
lence of different types of crime may vary systematically within and 
across countries and they may have different impacts on economic 
performance. In this section we distinguish two types of crime: violent 
crime which is the average proportion of surveyed population who 
have been victims of robbery or assault and property crime which is 
the average of  the victimization rates for  burglary, car-, motorcycles- 
and  personal property theft.  
 
Results from the GMM regressions in table 641 suggest that although 
violent crime and property crime interact with police corruption they 
have different effect on economic development. Unlike overall crime, 
violent crime has no direct effect on economic performance. On the 
other hand property crime has a surprising, positive and significant 
direct impact on the economic activities. But, does such an effect per-
sist when we take into account the indirect effects?. 
 
                                                 
40  We don’t investigate whether aggregation bias affects our results. For discussions on ag-
gregation bias in the economic model of crime see for example Cherry and List (2002) 
and Garett (2003). 
41  The OLS regressions are reported in appendix 8. 
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Table 6: Violent crime and property crime effects on GDP per capita 
 
 (2) (3) (4) (6) (7) (8) 
 GMM GMM GMM GMM GMM GMM 
       
Police corruption 
(POLCOR) 
-0.511*** -0.501** -0.249 -0.378*** -0.310*** -0.255 
 (-4.125) (-2.514) (-0.987) (-3.951) (-3.199) (-1.585) 
Violent Crime 0.162 0.136 0.0425    
 (1.360) (0.917) (0.562)    
Property Crime    0.303*** 0.271*** 0.167* 
    (2.713) (3.208) (1.779) 
Latitude  0.0240* 0.00890  0.0343*** 0.0126* 
  (1.706) (1.254)  (3.009) (2.044) 
Dummy for tropi-
cal region 
 0.904 0.528  0.462 0.522 
  (0.894) (0.826)  (0.687) (0.991) 
Dummy for land-
locked countries 
 0.405* 0.378  0.536*** 0.423* 
  (1.910) (1.377)  (2.778) (2.006) 
Education   -0.00739   -0.000850 
   (-0.0979)   (-0.0160) 
Life expectancy   0.0558   0.0630* 
   (1.206)   (1.957) 
Urbanization rate   0.0199   0.0127 
   (1.418)   (1.506) 
Constant 9.316*** 8.227*** 3.581 9.287*** 7.630*** 3.180 
 (17.36) (8.810) (1.216) (39.69) (13.34) (1.554) 
       
Observations 43 41 34 43 41 34 
R-squared -1.140 -0.917 0.519 -0.193 0.284 0.590 
Hansen J statistic 2.183 1.144 6.071 4.428 4.120 5.044 
p-value of Hansen 
J statistic 
0.823 0.950 0.299 0.490 0.532 0.411 
 
Notes: All regressions are two step instrumental variables, implemented in Stata using ivreg2 with robust, gmm 
and small options. Robust t-statistics in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The dependent variable is 
the log of the average real GDP per capita over 1980-2004. Violent crime, property crime and police corruption 
are the endogenous variables. Violent crime is the average proportion of surveyed population victims of robbery 
and assault and the property crime which is the average of the average proportion of population victims of bur-
glary, auto and motorcycles theft and personal property theft. Police corruption is calculated as average propor-
tion of populations who were victims of bribery in police. The original data come from the integrated ICVS 
including all waves for each country over the period 1989-2005. The list of instruments for both crime types 
includes the lagged crime, the abortion law status, the level of trust in the society, the cultural dimension cap-
tured by the Hofstede’s power distance index. The list of instruments of police corruption includes the British 
legal origin, the proportion of Catholics, protestants and Muslims in 1980. For more detailed variables definition 
and sources see appendix A3  
3.2. Indirect impact of violent and property crime 
Table 7 shows that the total indirect impact of property crime is nega-
tive. The method applied is the same as for the average crime analysis. 
This indirect impact outweighs greatly the positive direct effect. In 
fact, adding the negative impact (-0. 252) to the impact estimated in 
table 6 with the same covariates (0.303), the total effect of violent 
crime is negative (-0.085). The main channel of this negative impact 
of the property crime is police corruption. Table 7 emphasizes a nega-
tive and significant effect of violent crime on the long run develop-
ment. For 1 point increase of violent crime, the real GDP per capita 
decreases by 0.8. In addition to police corruption, this negative impact 
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of violent crime is transmitted through a lowering of urbanization rate 
and a reduction of life expectancy.  
 
Table 7- Indirect effect of crime types 
 
 Violent crime Property crime 
Indirect effect of education 0.010 
[0.085] 
0.000 
[0.028] 
Indirect effect urbanization -0.226** 
[0.093] 
-0.008 
[0.022] 
Indirect effect life expectancy -0.27* 
[0.152] 
-0.093 
[0.084] 
Indirect effect police corruption -0.263*** 
[0.062] 
-0.152** 
[0.075] 
Total indirect effect -0.757*** 
[0.248] 
-0.252 ** 
[0.111] 
10000 bootstrap replicates. Due to the convergence conditions, coefficient esti-
mates and standard error estimates include only 7294 complete replicates. Boot-
strap standard Errors are in the brackets. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
4. Additional tests 
4.1. Alternative measures of level of development 
Several robustness tests are conducted. First we use three different 
variables of GDP, all purchasing power parity (PPP) adjusted: real 
GDP per capita in 2007, GDP per worker over 1990-2004 and GDP 
per capita in 1995, We use GDP per capita in 2007, which is the latest 
year available in the Penn World Table 6.3, in order to reduce the bias 
of simultaneity between crime, police corruption and the income per 
capita. The GDP per worker captures the productivity of the economy 
and the GDP per capita in 1995 is used as in several empirical studies 
such Acemoglu et al (2001), Rodrik et al, (2004).42  
 
The GMM estimates reported in table 8 below confirm the direct 
negative impact of police corruption. The coefficient of crime rates 
display similar results as in the above analyses, though sometimes the 
coefficient become positive but then not significant Hence, in general 
we can fairly state that crime has no impact on any of the alternative 
measures of GDP. 
  
Table 9 highlights the negative indirect impact of the overall crime 
regardless of the measure of GDP used. Indirect effects are still trans-
mitted by the means of police corruption, urbanization, and life expec-
tancy and at some extent education. 
 
                                                 
42  It could also make sense to examine whether there is no systematic difference of the im-
pact of crime and police corruption between developed countries and developing coun-
tries. Due to the nature of the ICVS data, a large proportion of our sample concerns the 
developed countries, where, unlike developing countries, surveys are conducted at na-
tional level. Respondents in developed countries, where the economic performance is 
higher, are less likely to be confronted to crime or police corruption. On the contrary, in 
the developing countries, with poor economic performance, it is likely that respondents 
are more facing criminal activities and police corruption. Moreover, as documented by 
Abramo (2007), there is a difference in terms of experience of corruption between rich 
countries (with GDP per capita above US$10,000) and poor countries (with GDP per cap-
ita below US$10,000). Thus, one may question whether the previous results established 
are not driven by such above considerations. In order to cope with this problem, we at-
tempted to do the same regressions as previously done for developing countries and de-
veloped countries. From the baseline sample, we have 48 developing countries and 26 de-
veloped countries. However, the missing data for most explanatory variables combined 
with the erratic nature of the ICVS data make it impossible draw a firm conclusion from it 
(appendix 10). 
Table 8: Test of robustness with alternative measure of GDP per capita 
 Dependent variable: GDP per capita in 2007 Dependent variable: GDP per worker (log) Dependent variable: GDP per capita in 1995 
Average crime rate 0.162 0.128 0.0252 0.0711 0.158 0.175 0.211 0.188 0.221 0.0612 0.199 0.190 
 (1.404) (1.254) (0.783) (0.961) (1.329) (1.564) (1.602) (1.473) (1.431) (0.656) (1.323) (1.326) 
Police corruption (POLCOR) -0.398*** -0.316*** -0.0195 -0.270*** -0.363*** -0.452 -0.449** -0.435*** -0.510*** -0.255 -0.451** -0.483*** 
 (-4.523) (-4.006) (-0.362) (-2.994) (-3.812) (-1.565) (-2.648) (-3.754) (-3.994) (-1.120) (-2.321) (-3.752) 
Latitude  0.0293*** 0.0143**   0.00732    0.0108   
  (3.097) (2.672)   (0.864)    (1.370)   
Dummy for tropical region  0.296 0.0274   0.777    0.688   
  (0.593) (0.108)   (0.878)    (1.080)   
Dummy for landlocked countries  0.374 0.0470   0.628*    0.418   
  (1.491) (0.338)   (1.925)    (1.579)   
Life expectancy   0.0894***   0.0392    0.0739   
   (4.991)   (0.759)    (1.610)   
Education   0.0444   -0.0846    -0.0309   
   (1.340)   (-1.061)    (-0.444)   
Urbanization rate   0.000456   0.0264    0.0193   
   (0.136)   (1.671)    (1.589)   
Informal economy in 1999    -0.0287**   -0.00607    -0.0129  
    (-2.578)   (-0.278)    (-0.551)  
Gini Index     0.000184   0.0116    0.00845 
     (0.0120)   (0.602)    (0.389) 
Constant 9.871*** 8.535*** 2.296* 10.63*** 9.837*** 5.412* 10.01*** 9.604*** 9.183*** 2.310 9.451*** 8.985*** 
 (23.23) (15.04) (1.907) (27.19) (17.03) (1.738) (13.37) (13.86) (16.45) (0.797) (11.49) (11.39) 
             
Observations 43 41 34 41 42 34 41 42 44 35 42 43 
R-squared -0.523 0.058 0.855 0.177 -0.397 -0.167 -0.849 -0.724 -0.783 0.480 -0.458 -0.627 
Hansen J statistic 5.145 7.360 7.289 10.32 7.501 2.018 3.195 3.529 2.578 5.629 3.271 3.641 
p-value of Hansen J statistic 0.525 0.289 0.295 0.112 0.277 0.847 0.670 0.619 0.765 0.344 0.658 0.602 
 
Notes: All regressions are two step instrumental variables, implemented in Stata using ivreg2 with robust, gmm and small options. Robust t-statistics in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Crime and police 
corruption are the two endogenous variables Crime rate (and police corruption) are calculated as average proportion of populations who were victims of types of crimes such theft, robbery, assault or burglary (and 
bribery in police) The original data come from the integrated ICVS including all waves for each country over the period 1989-2005. The list of instruments for both crime types includes the lagged crime, the abor-
tion law status, the level of trust in the society, the cultural dimension captured by the Hofstede’s power distance index. The list of instruments of police corruption includes the British legal origin, the proportion of 
Catholics, protestants and Muslims in 1980. For more detailed variables definition and sources see appendix A3  
 
Table 9: Indirect effects of crime rate with alternative measures of GDP 
 
 GDP per capita 
2007 
GDP per 
woker 
GDP per capita 
1995 
Indirect effect of education 0.001 
[0.021] 
0.026* 
[0.016] 
0.009 
[0.020] 
Indirect effect urbanization -0.015 
[0.022] 
-0.112*** 
[0.039] 
-0.082* 
[0.044] 
Indirect effect life expectancy 0.338** 
[0.145] 
-0.183* 
[0.104] 
-0.346*** 
[0.114] 
Indirect effect police corruption -0.251*** 
[0.089] 
-0.460*** 
[0.087] 
-0.259*** 
[0.093] 
Total indirect effect -0.604** 
[0.153] 
-0.729*** 
[0.129] 
-0.678*** 
[0.137] 
Nb. replications 7317 3177 3187 
Bootstrap standard Errors are in the brackets. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
4.2- Alternative measure of police corruption 
The second set of robustness tests rely on an alternative measure of 
police corruption. Here the indicator of police corruption is computed 
from Transparency International 2006 global corruption barometer 
surveys. It measures the proportion of individuals who answer yes to 
the following question: “In the past 12 months, have you or anyone 
living in your household paid a bribe in any form to each of the fol-
lowing institution/organisation?-Police”. As one can see, this ques-
tion differs from the ICVS one in that it concerns the household ex-
perience instead of individual experience. Hence, this indicator is 
likely to be higher than the ICVS police corruption, which measures 
only individual experience (see appendix 10). Moreover, measurement 
errors are likely to be higher here since surveyed individuals must 
conjecture the corruption experience of other relatives. This index has 
finally inconveniently covered only 34 countries.43 
 
Results based on Transparency International police corruption (table 
10) are consistent with those previously obtained: once again the 
negative effect of police corruption is highlighted and crime is not 
robustly significant. 
                                                 
43  We tried to increase the number of observations by merging all Transparency Interna-
tional data available for 2006, 2007 and 2008. This allows us to gain 16 more observa-
tions for police corruption. However, when we introduce this variable into our regres-
sions, we add only 5 more observations and our results do not change fundamentally. 
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Table 10: Test of robustness with Transparency International measure of 
Police corruption 
 
 
 
In table 11 below, we estimate the indirect effects of crime using the 
Transparency International police corruption index and the three 
measures of GDP. The negative indirect effect of crime is confirmed. 
Transmission channels are only police corruption and urbanization, 
however.  
 
 Dependent variable: Real GDP per capita (log) Dependent variable: GDP per worker (log) 
Police Cor-
ruption TI 
-
0.056*** 
-0.077 -0.0165 -
0.059*** 
-
0.0535*** 
-0.059 -0.0141 -
0.065*** 
 (-5.843) (-1.568) (-1.685) (-6.525) (-6.113) (-1.331) (-1.221) (-7.126) 
Average 
crime rate 
-0.0465 -0.361 -0.0332 -0.0724 -0.0179 -0.293 -0.0166 -0.0884 
 (-0.925) (-1.357) (-1.549) (-0.950) (-0.382) (-1.212) (-0.744) (-1.106) 
Latitude  -0.0127    -0.0147   
  (-0.765)    (-0.944)   
Dummy 
tropical 
region 
 1.894    1.289   
  (1.064)    (0.804)   
Landlocked 
countries 
 0.104    0.147   
  (0.522)    (0.979)   
Life expec-
tancy 
 -0.0633    -0.0427   
  (-1.005)    (-0.753)   
Education  0.0612    0.0317   
  (1.224)    (0.692)   
Urbanization 
rate 
 0.0506    0.0440   
  (1.738)    (1.665)   
Informal 
economy 
  -
0.0348*** 
   -
0.0333** 
 
   (-3.062)    (-2.728)  
Gini Index    0.00899    0.0282* 
    (0.553)    (1.730) 
Constant 10.21*** 12.62** 10.60*** 10.05*** 10.78*** 12.29** 11.22*** 10.24*** 
 (53.08) (2.682) (58.83) (28.80) (60.22) (2.906) (63.23) (29.47) 
         
Observations 26 20 25 26 26 20 25 26 
R-squared 0.465 0.623 0.817 0.446 0.346 0.540 0.773 0.179 
Hansen J 
statistic 
4.675 5.445 7.523 4.589 5.446 4.467 7.587 4.142 
p-value of 
Hansen J 
statistic 
0.457 0.364 0.185 0.468 0.364 0.484 0.180 0.529 
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Table 11: Indirect effects using Transparency International Police corrup-
tion 
 
 RealGDPPC RealGDPWOK GDPPC1995 
Indirect effect of education -0.019 
[0.042] 
-0.010 
[0.033] 
-0.018 
[0.033] 
Indirect effect urbanization -0.215* 
[0.132] 
-0.187* 
[0.104] 
-0.157** 
[0.063] 
Indirect effect life expectancy 0.296 
[0.217] 
0.200 
[0.152] 
0.174 
[0.119] 
Indirect effect police corruption -0.579*** 
[0.086] 
-0.448*** 
[0.091] 
-0.437*** 
[0.083] 
Total indirect effect -0.516** 
[0.225] 
-0.445** 
[0.183] 
-0.439*** 
[0.144] 
Nb. replications 3163 3171 3101 
Bootstrap standard Errors are in the brackets. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
4.3. Evidence from pooled data 
In the previous sections, we argue that cross-country averages are 
more appropriate to handle the weaknesses of the ICVS data. Never-
theless, one may question whether some unobservable factors are not 
affecting our main results. The ideal would be to deal with such issues 
using panel data technique, but for  reasons mentioned above, the re-
sults from this method are likely not to be precise. To approximate the 
ideal  we conduct now  analyses on e pooled data of the five ICVS 
(1989, 1992, 1996, 2000 and 2004). Hence, for each ICVS wave we 
consider all countries for which we have observations. Time dummies 
are included in all the regression in order to control for the unobserved 
common factors that affect the economic performance of countries as 
well as their crime levels and police corruption. We also correct for 
the heteroskedasticity, possible autocorrelation and spatial correlation 
between countries.  
 
The results reported in table 12 are consistent with those obtained: the 
negative impact of crime and police corruption on economic devel-
opment and the interactions between on the one hand crime and police 
corruption and one other hand between crime and human capital ac-
cumulation. 
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Table 12- regression with pooled data 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 Pooled 
OLS 
Pooled 
OLS 
Pooled 
OLS 
Pooled 
OLS 
Pooled 
OLS 
Pooled 
OLS 
Pooled 
OLS 
        
Average 
crime rate 
-
0.184*** 
-
0.115*** 
-
0.0566*** 
-
0.0627*** 
-
0.0240*** 
-
0.0607*** 
-
0.0902*** 
 (-7.725) (-8.391) (-2.850) (-2.795) (-3.608) (-6.244) (-3.149) 
Police cor-
ruption 
(POLCOR) 
 -
0.114*** 
-
0.0879*** 
-
0.0417*** 
-
0.0537*** 
-0.110*** -
0.0525*** 
  (-16.02) (-6.837) (-4.274) (-4.611) (-18.54) (-9.487) 
Absolute 
value of 
latitude 
  0.0181*** 0.0114*** -0.000930   
   (3.401) (4.717) (-0.334)   
Dummy for 
tropical 
region 
  -0.260** -0.491*** -0.357***   
   (-2.269) (-5.181) (-3.478)   
Dummy for 
landlocked 
countries 
  -0.238*** -0.0607 0.0167   
   (-2.870) (-0.948) (0.373)   
Dummy 
Africa 
   -0.935***    
    (-10.54)    
Dummy 
Latin amer-
ica 
   -0.0637    
    (-0.427)    
East Europe 
and Asia 
(EEA) 
   -0.976***    
    (-7.925)    
Education     0.0530***   
     (6.584)   
Life expec-
tancy 
    0.0244***   
     (2.768)   
Urbanization 
rate 
    0.0236***   
     (16.19)   
Gini Index      -
0.0194*** 
 
      (-7.255)  
Informal 
economy 
      -
0.0331*** 
       (-30.64) 
Constant 10.44*** 10.38*** 9.416*** 9.962*** 6.030*** 10.89*** 10.94*** 
 (159.8) (259.9) (29.71) (66.47) (8.024) (98.35) (118.9) 
Time dum-
mies 
YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 153 153 153 153 153 153 153 
R-squared 0.286 0.385 0.511 0.712 0.784 0.418 0.562 
 
Note: Robust t-statistics in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The dependent variable is the 
log of the average real GDP per capita. The pooled data cover five years (1989, 1992, 1996, 2000 and 
2004). Most variables (crime, police corruption, life expectancy, urbanization) are taken according to 
these years. For education, we take the 1980-85 average for 1989, 1985-1990 for 1992, 1990-95 for 1996, 
1995-2000 for 2000 and 200o for 2004. The Gini coefficient refer to 2004 and the informal economy to 
the years 1990s. The other variables are dummies as defined in appendix 3. Time dummies included, with 
2004 as the period of reference. Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity, possible autocorrelation 
and correlation between countries. 
 
Conclusion 
The objective of this paper is to analyze the consequences of crime 
and police corruption on the level of development using crime vic-
timization statistics that so far has only rarely been used for the pur-
pose. While the existing literature on economic crime focus on the 
consequences of development on crime rate, we attempt in this study 
to assess the reverse effect, that is, the effect of crime on development. 
Although corruption in the police is higher in the public administra-
tion in developing countries; no attempt has been made to empirically 
estimate its effects on the process of development. Not only police 
activities in the society are necessary to secure private properties, but  
they also contribute to the enforcement of the law and hence to devel-
opment. We expected from theoretical considerations that extensive 
corruption in the police would have an overall negative impact on the 
development process. That expectation was confirmed. Moreover we 
traced empirically some of the various mechanisms through which we 
expected the crime effects to work. An important one was through its 
relationship with police. Although the empirical observations used 
made it impossible to use data that could reflect the relationship be-
tween police corruption and organized crime, we found that the insti-
tutional cluster consisting of crime and police behavior appears to 
have a strongly significant effect on economic development. Here we 
have sought to document the interactions between the police and regu-
lar criminal activities with identifiable victims (except murder) and 
their joint effects on development. Regarding econometric methodol-
ogy we used instrumental variables approach to assess the direct im-
pacts of both crime and police corruption. We use non parametric 
bootstrapping approach to estimate the indirect effects of crime. Since 
we expected that the effects of crime on long-run productivity should 
be rather roundabout, we have made considerable effort in studying 
these indirect effects and their channels.  
 
The main results of our investigations are as follows. First, unlike po-
lice corruption, crime seems to have no robust direct and significant 
impact on the level of development. Secondly, we show that the main 
effects of crime, although negative, are rather indirect. Hence, crime 
affects the level of GDP per capita through police corruption and hu-
man capital accumulation (education and life expectancy) and urbani-
zation. Finally, we found that the magnitude of the impact of crime on 
development differs according to crime types, such as violence crime 
and property crime. For both crime types, the indirect effect through 
police corruption is strong. 
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Appendices 
Appendix 1. List of countries 
 
bm country bm country 
ALB Albania KHM Cambodia 
ARG Argentina LSO Lesotho 
AUS Australia LTU Lithuania 
AUT Austria LUX Luxembourg 
AZE Azerbaijan LVA Latvia 
BEL Belgium MEX Mexico 
BGR Bulgaria MKD Macedonia 
BLR Belarus MLT Malta 
BOL Bolivia MNG Mongolia 
BRA Brazil MOZ Mozambique 
BWA Botswana NAM Namibia 
CAN Canada NGA Nigeria 
CHE Switzerland NLD Netherlands 
CHN China NOR Norway 
COL Colombia NZL New Zealand 
CRI Costa Rica PAN Panama 
CZE Czech Republic PER Peru 
DEU Germany PHL Philippines 
DNK Denmark POL Poland 
EGY Egypt PRK Republic of 
ESP Spain PRT Portugal 
EST Estonia PRY Paraguay 
FIN Finland ROM Rumania 
FRA France RUS Russia 
GBR United Kingd SVK Slovak Republic 
GEO Georgia SVN Slovenia 
GRC Greece SWE Sweden 
HKG Hong Kong SWZ Swaziland 
HRV Croatia TUN Tunisia 
HUN Hungary TUR Turkey 
IDN Indonesia TZA Tanzania 
IND India UGA Uganda 
IRL Ireland UKR Ukrain 
ISL Iceland USA USA 
ITA Italy ZAF South Africa 
JPN Japan ZMB Zambia 
KGZ Kyrgyzstan ZWE Zimbabwe 
Total  74   
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Appendix 2. Sample composition and the ICVS waves 
 
continent Wave 1 Wave 2 Wave 3 Wave 4 Wave 5 
      
Africa 0 4 5 8 1 
Asia 1 5 4 6 2 
East Europe 0 7 18 15 6 
Latin America 0 3 6 4 3 
West Europe 9 7 7 10 18 
Other developed countries 3 3 2 3 4 
      
Total 13 29 42 46 34 
The figures in the cells refer to the number of countries covered by each ICVS wave in each group of 
country. 
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Appendix 3. Definitions of variables 
 
 Definition source 
Real GDP per capita Real GDP per capita (Chain): RGDPCH [17] 
Base year 2000. Average over the period 1980-2004 and 2007 
GDP per worker Real GDP chain per worker: RGDPWOK [19] 
Penb World Table 6.3. 
Heston, summers and 
Aten (2009) 
Average crime rate Proportion of individuals who are victims of the following type of 
crime over the last two years: car theft (question C01A100, modal-
ity 2), theft from car (question C02A100, modality 2), theft from 
motorcycle (question C04A100, modality 2), bicycle theft (question 
C05 A100, modality 2), burglary (question C06A100, modality 2), 
attempt at burglary (question C07A100, modality 2), Robbery 
(question C09A100, modality 2)., theft from personal property 
(question C10A100, modality 2), Assault (question C12A100, 
modality 2),.  
Lagged crime rate Proportion of individuals who are victims of the above defined type 
of crime over the last five years (modality 1 of C01A000, 
C02A000, C04A000, C05A000, C06A000, C07A000, C09A000 
C10A000, C12A000)  
Police corruption Proportion of individuals victims of police corruption.” Based on 
the question “…During the [year the survey was conducted], has 
any government official, for instance, a police officer or inspector 
in your country asked you, or expected you to pay bribe for his or 
her services?” 
Calculations based on the 
Integrated International 
Crime Victimization 
Surveys data 1980-2005 
Kesteren (2007) 
Trust Level of trust within the society to other people World Values Survey 
Dummy for tropical region Equal to 1 if a country is tropical region, 0 otherwise  
Dummy for landlocked coun-
tries 
Equal to 1 if a country is landlocked, 0 otherwise  
Dummy Africa Equal to 1 if a country is in Sub-Saharan Africa, 0 otherwise  
Dummy Latin America Equal to 1 if a country is in Latin America, 0 otherwise  
East Europe and Asia  Equal to 1 if a country is in East Europe or Asia, 0 otherwise  
GDP per capita in 1995 GDP per capita, PPP (current international $), year 1995.  
Life expectancy Life expectancy at birth indicates the number of years a newborn 
infant would live if prevailing patterns of mortality at the time of its 
birth were to stay the same throughout its life. 
Urbanization rate Urban population (% of total) Urban population is the midyear 
population of areas defined as urban in each country and reported to 
the United Nations. 
World Development 
Indicators (2008) 
Education Schooling years in the total population. Average over the period 
1980-1985 
Barro and Lee (2000) 
 
Gini Index GINI coefficient UNDP, Human Devel-
opment Report (2004) 
Informal economy Unofficial activity as a percent of GDP in the 1990s Friedman, Johnson, 
Kaufmann, and Zoido-
Lobatón (2000) 
Abortion legal status Whether abortion is permitted without any restriction or permitted 
on socio-economic grounds. 
 
British colonies Equal to 1 if a country is former British colony  Treisman (2000). 
Proportion of Catholics Catholics as % of population 1980 
Proportion of Protestants Protestants as % of population 1980 
Proportions of Muslims Muslims as % of population 1980 
Latitude Absolute value of latitude 
La Porta et al.(1999) 
Cultural distance Measured by the power distance index: the extent to which the less 
powerful members of organizations and institutions (like the fam-
ily) accept and expect that power is distributed unequally. 
From Geert Hofstede 
website 
http://www.geert-
hofstede.com/ 
 
Jens Chr. Andvig and Gbewopo Attila 46 
Appendix 4. Descriptive statistics of different types of crime 
 
  Statistics Theft Robbery Assault Property Burglary 
   
Min 1.584 1.901 1.013 7.069 6.700 
Mean 3.596 4.075 5.467 11.251 13.007 
SD 1.691 1.707 2.345 4.242 3.946 Africa 
Max 7.551 7.553 10.239 20.577 18.328 
Min 0.628 0.000 0.442 0.396 0.964 
Mean 2.878 0.970 2.339 7.455 6.130 
SD 1.684 0.990 1.734 6.173 5.532 Asia 
Max 5.589 3.545 5.090 19.869 16.640 
Min 1.798 0.300 0.644 2.818 1.900 
Mean 3.837 1.661 2.970 7.725 5.088 
SD 1.367 0.808 1.005 3.739 1.850 
East 
Europe 
Max 6.969 3.468 4.629 18.135 8.052 
Min 2.547 0.887 0.000 3.991 4.009 
Mean 4.392 6.219 3.454 9.671 10.746 
SD 1.649 3.023 2.390 4.797 4.989 
Latin 
America 
Max 7.308 10.020 8.532 17.017 19.097 
Min 1.320 0.375 0.939 2.169 1.436 
Mean 3.024 0.916 2.832 4.046 3.299 
SD 0.985 0.406 1.089 0.951 1.234 
West 
Europe 
Max 4.791 1.947 4.570 6.340 6.472 
Min 2.775 0.733 4.092 4.415 2.984 
Mean 3.457 0.994 4.719 5.401 4.759 
SD 0.558 0.267 0.818 1.092 1.234 
Other 
countries 
Max 3.941 1.345 5.916 6.963 5.705 
Min 0.628 0.000 0.000 0.396 0.964 
Mean 3.505 2.287 3.401 7.473 6.762 
SD 1.445 2.268 1.879 4.521 4.790 All 
Max 7.551 10.020 10.239 20.577 19.097 
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Appendix 5. Crime and police corruption: top and bottom tens 
 
 Crime rate Police corruption 
Ten highest Colombia (11.59), Zim-
babwe (9.53 
Uganda (9.21) 
Swaziland (9.13) 
Mozambique (8.54) 
Tanzania (8.52) 
Bolivia (8.51) 
Mongolia (8.50) 
Tunisia (8.44) 
Paraguay (7.92) 
Nigeria (12.85) 
Bolivia(10.61) 
Mozambique (10.17) 
Mexico (8.84) 
Colombia (7.89) 
Cambodia (6.66) 
Russia (6.51) 
Croatia (5.70) 
Uganda  (5.22) 
Kyrgyztan (5.03) 
 
Ten lowest Hong Kong  (1.43) 
Azerbaijan (1.56) 
Japan (1.73) 
Luxembourg (2.00) 
Portugal (2.26) 
Greece(2.42) 
Austria (2.48) 
Philippines (2.53) 
Norway (2.75) 
Finland (2.81) 
Iceland (0) 
Peru (0) 
SWZ (0) 
Egypt (0) 
Lesotho (0) 
Swaziland (0) 
Namibia(0) 
Zambia(0) 
China (0) 
Finland (0) 
Norway (0)  
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Appendix 6. Correlation between crime, police corruption and 
their instruments 
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Figure A1: Correlation between crime, police corruption and instruments
 
Crime, Police Corruption and Development  
 
49 
Appendix 7. Using infant mortality rate instead of life expectancy 
 
 (1) (2) 
 OLS GMM 
   
Average crime rate 0.0154 -0.0121 
 (0.451) (-0.373) 
Police corruption (POLCOR) -0.0170 0.0764 
 (-0.662) (1.648) 
Absolute value of latitude 0.0146** 0.0103** 
 (2.683) (2.119) 
Dummy for tropical region 0.0160 -0.260 
 (0.0728) (-1.348) 
Dummy for landlocked countries 0.0655 0.266 
 (0.405) (1.232) 
Infant mortality under 5 -0.00837*** -0.0149*** 
 (-4.233) (-4.664) 
Total years of education 0.0626** 0.0726** 
 (2.134) (2.352) 
Urbanization rate 0.0111** 0.00610 
 (2.439) (1.256) 
Constant 7.769*** 8.462*** 
 (18.09) (18.52) 
Observations 48 37 
R-squared 0.880 0.860 
Hansen J statistic  8.013 
p-value of Hansen J statistic  0.156 
 
Notes: Robust t-statistics in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The dependent variable is the log of 
the average real GDP per capita over 1980-2004. Crime and police corruption are the two endogenous variables 
Crime rate (and police corruption) are calculated as average proportion of populations who were victims of 
types of crimes such theft, robbery, assault or burglary (and bribery in police). The original data come from the 
integrated ICVS including all waves for each country over the period 1989-2005. The list of instruments for 
crime includes the lagged crime, the abortion law status, the level of trust in the society. The list of instruments 
of police corruption includes the British legal origin, the proportion of Catholics, protestants and Muslims in 
1980. For more detailed variables definition and sources see appendix A2 
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Appendix 8. Violent crime, property crime and development: OLS 
regressions 
 
 (2) (3) (4) (6) (7) (8) 
       
Police corruption 
(POLCOR) 
-
0.118*** 
-0.0875** -0.0293 -
0.140*** 
-0.108*** -0.0404 
 (-3.387) (-2.544) (-1.142) (-3.561) (-2.827) (-1.609) 
Violence Crime -
0.176*** 
-0.108** 0.00862    
 (-3.855) (-2.274) (0.286)    
Property Crime    -0.113 6.64e-05 0.0550* 
    (-1.648) (0.000946) (1.749) 
Absoute value of lati-
tude 
 0.0316*** 0.0134**  0.0385*** 0.0139** 
  (3.195) (2.364)  (3.854) (2.576) 
Dummy for tropical 
region 
 0.268 0.0244  0.279 0.0376 
  (0.708) (0.0953)  (0.729) (0.153) 
Dummy for landlocked 
countries 
 -0.246 0.172  -0.352 0.168 
  (-0.918) (1.037)  (-1.283) (1.015) 
Total years of educa-
tion 
  0.0588*   0.0578* 
   (1.907)   (1.912) 
Life expectancy   0.0414***   0.0483*** 
   (2.742)   (3.509) 
Urbanization rate   0.0126***   0.0105** 
   (2.766)   (2.363) 
Constant 10.21*** 8.577*** 4.525*** 9.507*** 7.743*** 4.063*** 
 (39.00) (14.45) (4.299) (48.47) (14.59) (4.589) 
       
Observations 72 65 49 72 65 49 
R-squared 0.414 0.573 0.876 0.265 0.522 0.882 
Robust t-statistics in 
parentheses 
      
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, 
* p<0.1 
      
 
Crime, Police Corruption and Development  
 
51 
Appendix 9. Analyses on subsamples 
 
Table 9a: Regressions on developed countries 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 OLS OLS OLS GMM GMM GMM 
       
Average crime rate -0.0548 -0.0378 -0.0157 -0.0257 -0.0522 -0.0116 
 (-1.093) (-0.799) (-0.455) (-0.533) (-1.278) (-0.231) 
-0.939*** -0.515** -0.575*** -1.096*** -0.492 -0.884** Police corruption (POLCOR) 
(-6.950) (-2.755) (-3.885) (-3.100) (-1.020) (-2.294) 
Absolute value of latitude  0.00439   0.00606  
  (1.246)   (1.567)  
Dummy for tropical region  0.151     
  (1.710)     
 0.106   0.0948  Dummy for landlocked countries 
 (1.752)   (1.411)  
Life expectancy  0.00489   -0.00665  
  (0.154)   (-0.193)  
Total years of education  0.0513**   0.0521  
  (2.391)   (1.702)  
Informal economy   -0.015***   -0.0126* 
   (-2.898)   (-1.829) 
Constant 10.21*** 9.090*** 10.28*** 10.14*** 9.949*** 10.29*** 
 (53.62) (3.603) (82.44) (51.36) (3.488) (53.97) 
Observations 25 23 22 23 21 20 
R-squared 0.437 0.726 0.619 0.406 0.713 0.560 
Hansen J statistic    0.901 4.248 1.359 
p-value of Hansen J statistic    0.637 0.120 0.507 
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Table 9b: Regressions on developing countries 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 OLS OLS OLS GMM GMM GMM 
       
Average crime rate -0.0815 0.0836** -0.0837 -0.0522 0.109** -0.0546 
 (-1.467) (2.129) (-1.532) (-0.407) (3.162) (-0.594) 
-0.0357 -0.0139 -0.0147 0.147 0.00723 0.136 Police corruption  
(-0.823) (-0.465) (-0.341) (0.455) (0.173) (0.902) 
Absolute value of latitude  0.0243   0.0388*  
  (1.640)   (1.974)  
Dummy for tropical region  0.333   0.606  
  (0.741)   (1.499)  
 0.00235   -0.370  Dummy for landlocked countries 
 (0.00735)   (-0.567)  
Life expectancy  0.0482**   0.0227  
  (2.422)   (0.519)  
Total years of education  0.0664   0.0439  
  (0.888)   (0.581)  
Informal economy   -0.0151*   -0.0106 
   (-1.722)   (-0.923) 
Constant 8.922*** 3.751** 9.429*** 8.413*** 4.888* 8.869*** 
 (27.68) (2.665) (20.31) (11.95) (2.115) (17.67) 
Observations 47 26 46 34 16 34 
R-squared 0.072 0.659 0.142 -0.346 0.714 -0.191 
Hansen J statistic    1.980 1.296 4.954 
p-value of Hansen J statistic    0.372 0.523 0.0840 
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Appendix 10. ICVS police corruption and Transparency interna-
tional police corruption 
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Figure A1: ICVS police corruption versus TI police corruption
 
 
 
